Launched with considerable fanfare in 1969, the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) was supposed to bring new life to NATO by both re-energising public support and engaging with a variety of themes, issues and partners well beyond the alliance's traditional scope. The first aim of this article is to go beyond the careful media operation that surrounded the launch of the CCMS and to examine the scepticism and resistance of some European partners, particularly the British. The second aim is to demonstrate that NATO started to think in terms of crisis management, disaster relief and environmental disasters well before 1989. The sheer military strength of the alliance and of its partners did remain central -and notably came back to the forefront in 1979 -but the alliance did start to see itself as a geopolitical player and to consider engagement beyond its strictly defined geographical area as early as 1969. Contrary to the previous decade, the peace movements were separated from international communism, and in fact they were quite critical of the communist regimes as much as the Western governments for their lack of commitment to peace and international dialogue and for the economic, political and environmental consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2 The new political and environmental consciousness directly affected NATO, which was seen as responsible for perpetrating the logic of the Cold War and for being unaware of the concerns faced by its younger generations.
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Initially, the Science Committee made recommendations for the strengthening of pure science.
The ultimate aim was to increase the number of scientists and technicians across the alliance and to improve scientific and technical education. The programme aimed at reinforcing international cooperation including the free flow of specialists as well as of knowledge between the member states. It is important not to overestimate the impact that these initiatives had on the national research cultures and agendas. The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs had no actual power to influence the research carried out by the member states and could not shape their priorities, let alone the institutional cultures of their universities and research centres. As John Krige has pointed out, joint research ventures were often aborted because of the fear of sharing cutting-edge discoveries with other members or the risk that information relating to national security may be leaked. As a result, it was common for the national delegations on the Civil Budget Committee to veto the most audacious projects. Thus, after a promising start, the pure science program budget stabilised and the projects approved settled at low and rather unadventurous levels, where all national delegations felt comfortable.
These projects were hardly ground-breaking and exciting for scientists and therefore did not receive the participation of the biggest names in the field as it was initially hoped. 9 It is also worth pointing out that the decision-making process and research priorities of the Science Committee were determined by the experts volunteered by the national governments. As such, the experts were conscious of their own government's concerns and the interests of the Committee were routinely subordinated to those of its individual members. In addition, officers responsible for everyday science-related issues within the national delegations often had little or no scientific training. This is because in most cases NATO science was hardly perceived as a priority by the national governments.
Consequently, the person assigned to 'science matters' was more often than not one of the most junior members of the delegation and it was not uncommon for many of them to have little or no scientific training. Thus, while nominally all nations were interested in promoting closer scientific cooperation, in practice most of them did little more than pay lip service.
The United States was the most enthusiastic participant and as such it bore a large share of the costs for several research projects. Not surprisingly, in the light of its commitments, the United States demanded a say in the Committee's priorities and successfully had an American appointed Assistant Secretary General for the first ten years. In fact, it soon became a tradition that the Science Adviser, and later Assistant Secretary Generals for Scientific Affairs, was an American academic. For the first ten years all ASG for Scientific Affairs were physicists based in American universities: Norman Ramsey American calls for tighter collaboration and higher investment were hindered by the opposition of the other delegations, who wanted to have an equal say on the matter. The result was frustration and lack of enthusiasm for pure science across the spectrum. 10 Military leaders were hardly enthused by scientific cooperation in pure science and tended to favour its technical implementations for defence purposes only. Attempts to improve scientific cooperation were thus doomed to failure.
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National research institutes initially seemed interested. They offered administrative services and, wherever possible, financial support to the pure science programme in the hope that this would help them attract further funding from their own national governments. 12 Further support came from the North Atlantic Assembly, who discussed the issue at length during their annual meetings. Yet, all this had little effect on national policies. National governments continued to be reluctant to contribute money to projects that they deemed unrealistic and far-fetched. They were interested in the Science
Committee only as a way to channel additional funds for their own national research institutes;
however, when this appeared not to be the case, the lack of interest jeopardised the Committee's action.
Academics and researchers were also often opposed to the project as they feared that new international research institutes would drain away the best minds. The high level of centralisation and bureaucratisation also condemned the Science Committee to move slowly and to settle for the lowest common denominator to which all countries could agree.
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The Launch of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
In the late 1960s air and water pollution were widely discussed by experts, government agencies and the public more broadly. The rapid pace of industrialisation and dramatic economic changes meant that all NATO countries suffered industrial waste problems, water and air pollution, congestion of the transportation systems and overcrowding of their major towns. Wide sectors of the public, and particularly the younger generations, became increasingly critical of the way in which the economy was run and the environment was damaged. NATO's answer to this very heterogeneous set of challenges was to stress the provisions of article 2, which provided for closer economic, political and cultural cooperation among its members.
The Harmel Report of 1967 argued that the post-Stalin era NATO was necessary precisely because it meant more than military defence. The report made clear that a balance of military power was a prerequisite for the creation of the climate of stability in the East-West relations and that it was an essential precondition to allow the West to achieve progress in international negotiations with the Soviet bloc on issues like the division of Germany and the position of Berlin. At the same time, among the recommendations put forward by the report was the need to enhance political and scientific cooperation to boost popular support for the alliance in the member countries. The Harmel Report advocated strong 6 defence along with new diplomatic relations with the Eastern Bloc and called on NATO members to use the alliance in the interests of détente. 16 As far as NATO's information activities were concerned, the Harmel Report stated that public support for the alliance's defence efforts was vital to the accomplishment of the tasks ahead, and that it was crucial to explain to the public both the rationale underlying NATO's strategy and the alliance's efforts to preserve the military and defence balance between East and West. Public support for the defence effort was an essential for the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy. Without it, the deterrent value of NATO would be seriously undermined, as military and nuclear capabilities would mean little if there was not public support for their use. The approval of the Report therefore brought a review of the NATO information effort, demonstrating that it had to focus more clearly on fostering support among the wider public and on explaining the need for military strength as well as political cohesion at a time when neither seem to have been achieved at a satisfactory degree. This is when the United States proposed that the alliance establish a new body to 'explore ways in which the experiences and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshalled toward improving the quality of life of our people'. 17 Nixon made the announcement at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of NATO. He declared his personal interest in the matter and pushed for immediate action. Almost immediately, high-profile contacts took place in the capital's embassies. It was clear that the Nixon Administration was very keen on the project, as well as well organised and ready to push hard for immediate implementation. Yet, as discussed later, the 'steamroller approach' caused substantial irritation and frustration in the European capitals.
In the eyes of the Americans, the new Committee would demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of the alliance, its peaceful nature and its ability to adapt to new challenges. 18 Stephen Macekura has argued convincingly that, in effect, Nixon's primary objective was to gain more support for the alliance back at home, where NATO suffered waning support. Other historians, like Brooks Flippen and Jacob Darwin Hamblin, have underlined that Nixon's environmental concerns should be seen primarily as a tool for détente. 19 Despite the scepticism of several European members -which shall be discussed more in detail later -the North Atlantic Council agreed to establish the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). 20 Together with the Science Committee, the CCMS was supposed to become a central part of NATO's 'third dimension', complementing the alliance's military and political roles. The CCMS was much more outward-looking than the Science Committee both in terms of the themes it focused on, like pollution, car safety and urbanisation, which were great concerns of the public, as well as in terms of the level of media attention that it attracted -attention that was encouraged and at times carefully orchestrated by NATO's information officers.
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Like the Science Committee, the CCMS too was rooted in article 2, according to which member countries are committed to promote conditions of stability and well-being for their people, and, as such, it was presented as an integral part of the alliance's security concept. According to the new narrative, it had become clear that in addition to protecting the West from military attacks, the alliance had to ensure that national governments were ready to react promptly to natural disasters and that they understood the 7 wide-ranging implications of massive industrialisation and urbanisation. Most importantly, it was crucial to prevent natural disasters by working together and by studying the causes and consequences of environmental problems.
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From the start, it was understood that the CCMS would be a new kind of committee, revolutionary in mission and modus operandi. The CCMS was to further the political aims and overall cohesion of the alliance by focusing on a limited number of well-defined problems. Learning a lesson from the failures of the Science Committee, the CCMS had a limited mandate, no budget and no fulltime international staff. During the Cold War, the Committee's activity was characterised by a high degree of decentralisation. National representatives, at cabinet and subcabinet levels, met twice a year in plenary sessions. No funds from the NATO budget were allocated and projects had to be initiated by member countries. If the Council approved them, they were administered and paid for by the proposing country and other interested national governments. The 'pilot country' would also coordinate the project's execution, prepare the necessary reports and, most importantly, promote follow-up action at national and international levels. Precisely because of its limited mandate and light structure, it was hoped that the CCMS could avoid the problems that had hampered progress within the Science Committee.
Three key concepts characterised the work of the CCMS: first, all its work should lead to government policy formulation and legislation. Hence, the country who ran the pilot study would also monitor progress and press for follow up action -like, for example, new legislation or further studyby exerting political pressure in all international organisations and through bi-lateral contacts. Second, the CCMS would not be running its own independent research but would build upon research carried out by national governments, their research institutions and other international organisations. It would be directed towards questions of government policy formulation and legislation, suggesting ways to bring about improvements to the environment and social policies. 23 Finally, all CCMS results should be open and accessible to international organisations or individual countries anywhere in the world without prejudice. 24 Because of the transnational nature of the topics included in the CCMS's scope, the results transcended political ideology and therefore needed to be open to all countries 'including developing countries and the Communist ones'. 25 Publicity was deemed crucial as the CCMS dealt with problems that affected the daily life of the citizens of the alliance and beyond and contributed to the policymaking process. NATO had to explain why the alliance was engaging in these new fields and to what extent it was not duplicating what was already being done by other organisations, particularly the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 26 Given that the primary task of the CCMS was to demonstrate the progressive character of the alliance, it was essential to avoid overstatements and minimise disappointment. The risk was that the alliance would become hostage to its own ambitious goals. This was a point put forward mostly by the European members, who were aware of their own public's scepticism regarding anything that may taste, even remotely, like 'propaganda'. Any publicity campaign involving the CCMS had to be carefully measured against the prospects of concrete results and stress that factual results could be obtained only gradually and with the cooperation of all nations involved. All public statements about the CCMS had to avoid overambitious statements, which were deemed counterproductive. 27 
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All pilot studies were unclassified and were made available to any other countries and international organisations. The press was invited to the CCMS inaugural session and for the first time the invitation was formally extended to journalists from outside the NATO area. Journalists were welcomed at the headquarters and the invitation was renewed every time the CCMS met in plenary session. The CCMS press conferences were very popular with the media and the facilities for the press in the Council Room soon became inadequate and a larger conference room had to be created. 28 In all NATO and NATO-related publications, the CCMS was given several pages, with pictures and articles by leading experts on the topics studied by the CCMS. The NATO Information Service also commissioned a short film entitled The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (1974), which stands out from the rest of the films circulated in this period for its artistic choice of frame and for its lyric tone. 29 The United States Information Agency also planned a series of film and newsreels to publicise the activity of the CCMS. 30 Archival documents reveal that the NATO information officers engaged proactively with the national media to give maximum coverage to the first pilot studies carried out by the CCMS. 31 In all cases, the CCMS was presented to the public as one of the many examples of the multi-faceted nature of the alliance and of its entirely peaceful aims, a refrain repeated several times in all information material items.
The difference with the Science Committee was therefore not only procedural but also substantive: the CCMS was key to the alliance's attempt to engage with the public and to respond to youth's disaffection and concerns. At the same time, the launch of the CCMS marked a decisive step towards a new strategic concept: the label 'environment' encompassed a variety of subjects including disaster relief and crisis management. As discussed later in this article, at the time the CCMS could do little more than recommend more coordination among its members and suggest ways to work together with non-NATO members. It is therefore very difficult to qualify its success. However, the work of the CCMS should be seen as an attempt to redefine the security concept of the alliance and the idea of what constituted a threat. It was a first tangible sign that the alliance was moving towards a different kind of defence, which was not only military defence but defence of their populations and their well being. It points to a new awareness of the importance of out-of-area events and of the need to secure cooperation beyond the alliance itself. These ideas were very new at the time, marking a first important step away from direct military confrontation and helping to lay the basis for the post-1989 NATO's strategy and security.
Behind the Scenes
According to the NATO Letter and several NATO-related publications, Nixon's proposal for the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was ground-breaking. According to the narrative established at the time, the proposal was warmly received by the alliance and its members. The very fact that only eight months after the announcement, the CCMS was already operative was seen as a sign of its significance and widespread support. Subsequent articles in NATO-sponsored publications built on this idea by stressing the significance of the first pilot-studies, magnifying, if not overstating, their impact.
It is therefore important to look at the reasons behind Nixon's 1969 proposal, in addition to his 9 personal interest in the environment. 32 A few months after the publication of the Harmel Report, the Czechoslovak crisis shook the alliance; however, it did not alter NATO's basic view that the danger of an all-out Soviet assault was low. The alliance -and particularly its European members -were abuzz about the crisis' implications on détente and were keen to consult about how best to produce a united front. As discussed by several scholars, the history of the alliance during the Cold War was characterised by a tendency to fragmentation whenever tensions in East-West relations subsided. Each time the Soviet threat was allegedly reduced to manageable proportions, the differences among the allies mushroomed into sources of potential division. As a consequence, there were new calls for expanded consultation and pragmatic cooperation particularly from the smaller members. Yet, different views and security strategies persisted and created political tension. The result was 'a growing paradox, in which the alliance actually works better while dissatisfaction about it increases'. 33 The Nixon administration was aware that the alliance's political fragmentation might undermine its deterrent value and was keen to make constructive use of the call for enhanced consultation and increased cooperation. The correspondence between the State Department and the US Delegation at NATO reveals that the Americans were looking for effective ways to cement the alliance and overcome the difficulties of too many 'special cases'. 34 In addition, at a time when the United States was pursuing bilateral relations with Moscow, it was important to show that Washington remained committed to the alliance both for the success of the negotiations themselves as well as to reassure the NATO allies. In the eyes of the American administration, the launch of the CCMS squared the circle. It offered the opportunity to show their commitment to the alliance, to address the concern of the younger generations and to bring new non-ideological issues to the diplomatic table. Hence the CCMS was crucial to reassure the European allies and, as Macekura has argued, to boost support for the alliance at home. 35 Jacob Darwin Hamblin argues that Nixon saw the CCMS primarily -if not exclusively -as a tool with which to engage on environmental issues with the East as this allowed the President to move the discussion on to non-ideological territory. Yet, recent published sources suggest that appeasing the NATO allies while the United States was engaged in bi-lateral talks with the Soviet Union was -at the very least -the ultimate aim behind the launch of the CCMS. 36 Given that one of the key reasons to launch the project was to reassure the allies of US commitment to the alliance, the State Department monitored their reactions closely. According to Elliot
Richardson, Under Secretary of State, despite seemingly mixed reactions, the Europeans were supportive overall. 37 In order to maintain momentum, the Nixon administration did not waste time and
tried to obtain an early agreement in principle among the Permanent Representative for the establishment of the Committee. The assumption was that once the idea of a new Committee had been approved, the alliance could move on to the practical organisational arrangements.
The President attached personal support to the project and put it in the hands of two of his closest advisers: Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who at the time was Adviser for Urban Affairs, and Henry
Kissinger, National Security Advisor. Their role was to push the project forward and to make sure that it saw the light as soon as possible and in as an unadulterated form as diplomacy would allow it. 38 Kissinger liaised directly between the US NATO Delegation and the President, a further sign of its importance and urgency. Russell Train, who took over from Moynihan as head of the US CCMS 10 delegation in 1971, recalls that White House stationery was routinely used for all CCMS-related documents for all internal and external communications to give everybody a sense of the President's personal interest in the matter. 39 The Americans found an enthusiastic ally in Dr Gunnar Randers, Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs and Acting Chairman of the CCMS, who was happy to lend his influence to the Americans and to push for quick implementation. 40 The American enthusiasm was frustrated by what was perceived as the slow and cautious response of the Europeans, who pointed out that creating new structures within NATO and engaging in new fields had to be discussed thoroughly at national and alliance levels before proceeding any further.
This attitude irritated the Nixon Administration, who had made proposals through NAC precisely to cut across bureaucratic lines, avoid the traditional lengthy discussion at Foreign Ministries' level and proceed without prior consultation with the member governments. Yet, they had miscalculated.
Precisely because they had made their unexpected announcement in the Council, they had caused consternation and scepticism among the diplomats in Brussels as well as back in the capitals. To
European ears, Nixon's plans sounded as an announcement without consultation and consideration for the allies' opinion. 41 
In order to smooth what could still be called a miscommunication issue, NATO Secretary
General Manlio Brosio agreed to carry out a tour of the capitals and to gather support for the project. In most European capitals, Brosio was welcome, although the reactions of the European allies continued to be 'responsive in principle but cautious in practice'. 42 Many governments wondered why the new body should be placed within NATO and not within the United Nations and OECD, where the wider membership would allow to transcend ideological and geographical barriers and rely on a wider range of expertise. The Americans -whose primary aim was to make the alliance more appealing to their own public -argued:
Because NATO is there. It is unique. For almost two decades now it has carried on, at ever increasing levels of complexity, a massive system of technology transfer. There has been no such sustained experience in the history of the world. If technology is the issue, NATO is uniquely the forum in which to raise it . . . NATO is doubly appropriate, for here is an institution which year in and year out has been able to command attention and response at the highest levels of governments. 43 In addition -the Americans argued -NATO was one of the few international organisations that had a membership consisting of countries with the same sort of problems in terms of pollution, infrastructure, urbanisation and so on, and could therefore work as a small and coherent group. They responded to the claim that international organisations like the United Nations would be more suitable by saying that precisely because of the sheer number and diversity of its members it would be impossible to reach any useful conclusion. 44 They stressed that improving the image of the alliance was not only an American problem, but that it was also essential for all its members to show that there was more to NATO than tanks and fire jets. If the public had to be won over, they had to be shown that the alliance and its members understood their concerns about the environment, nuclear energy and society. 11 The risk of duplication was more difficult to brush off and doubts remained. Timid attempts to liaise with the OECD were to no avail and showed that NATO struggled not to step on other organisations' toes and to be perceived as a credible forum in which to discuss the wider implications of environmental issues. In the same period several other international organisations engaged with environmental concerns. At the time of the launch of the CCMS, for example, the United Nations called for a major conference on the 'Human Environment', which took place in 1972 in Stockholm. Hence many argued that other institutions, with a larger membership, and thus a better reflection of the area affected by pollution and other environmental problems, were better suited to discuss these issues. 45 The CCMS supporters argued that there was in fact no risk of duplication as the CCMS would not carry out any new research but rather collate available knowledge and ensure open discussion among experts in the field and better communication between researchers and policy-makers. In addition, it was claimed that even if, to a certain extent, there happened to be some duplication, this
would not be harmful as the ultimate aim of the new initiative was to create momentum for policy change. Therefore, if it did happen that, let's say, the United Nations and NATO reached a similar conclusion, then there would be more political pressure on national governments to do something about it. 46 What the CCMS supporters could not explain was what would happen if two or more international organisations reached different conclusions.
The Americans argued that the CCMS demonstrated NATO's genuine concern for the environment and that it also allowed the alliance to move on to new diplomatic ground. The environment transcended ideological barriers and could allow initiating new East-West relations. Alas, as several historians have already demonstrated, this approach quickly ran into difficulties. If the Eastern Bloc was keen to participate, the West had to face new criticism from developing countries, for whom the environment was a 'rich man's problem' and the key issues were poverty and development.
In order to give a further sign that the CCMS was very important to the President, the Americans toned down their voice in other international forums, such as, for example, during the discussions within the OECD's Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee on the Environment. At the first meeting they had pushed decisively to decide structure and aims; later they appeared more cautious and even expressed doubts as to whether the OECD was the right body for future expanded environmental work. Many NATO allies read this move as a sign that the Nixon Administration wanted the focus to remain on the CCMS. 47 The way in which high-level American officials were dispatched to the other NATO capitals to gather support, together with the demand that the new body to be set up immediately and without any further consultation, was disconcerting to the European allies. In July and August 1969 there was a dramatic increase in the pace of communication and meetings with an aim to make the CCMS operative by the end of the year. This caused consternation and uneasiness in the European capital: one British Foreign Office official commented on the margins of one of these documents with the word 'Horror!' 48 Many countries did not have the appropriate structures and expertise for coordinating internal work on environmental problems and were in the process of setting up new ones so as to be able to fully participate in the CCMS's work, which demanded both political will and resources. 49 Yet, it was difficult -if not impossible -to resist the pressure coming form Washington without creating a major 12 diplomatic crisis. By November, all European members had agreed to participate, albeit with different degrees of enthusiasm.
British Scepticism
Initially, Foreign Office officials were cautious. They were aware of Nixon's personal interest in environmental matters and of the need to improve the image of the alliance among the public. They knew that they had to appear keen and that they should not be seen to undermine the presidential initiative; at the same time, they were deeply critical of NATO's new role in environmental issues. They also feared unnecessary duplications with what was already being done more effectively by other international organisations. What was required was a careful balancing act showing willingness to participate while at the same time gaining time in the hope that the project would lose steam or divert its focus.
Archival documents reveal that several other Whitehall departments were equally sceptical of Nixon's proposals. They felt they would not be able to meet the additional demands this new body would impose on their experts. Many claimed that their staff was already 'heavily committed in various international organisations which are working in similar fields of interest at present' and that would be impossible for the United Kingdom to provide the adequate high-level expertise that the Americans expected. 50 This was in fact a time when the OECD, the Council of Europe and the United Nations had launched an array of wide-ranging initiatives concerning the environment, health and society in response to the public outcry at several natural and man-made disasters that had occurred in the 1960s, as well as to youth's more general disaffection. The result was the mushrooming of conferences and experts' meetings and the consequent insupportable pressure on the limited number of experts available. 51 As one FCO official pointed out: everyone is demanding high-level representation; they cannot have it. In many cases we cannot provide low-level representation and even if we could, the result might be worse than not attending at all. . . . The time has come when we have really got to decide where the least harm would be done if we dropped out altogether.
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A good example was the demand for experts in the field of air pollution, which was indeed a pressing topic at the time. The major British experts worked at the Warren Spring Laboratory in Stevenage. In early 1970 they really felt the pressure of too many international commitments, as they had to send an expert in September to the Council of Europe, a team to work on the OECD air pollution modelling project and were also asked if they could contribute to the CCMS. Social sciences reduced the risk of duplicating what was already being done by other organisations. In addition, they genuinely thought that social science problems were basic to the security of the alliance and of its members. The student and worker unrests were signs that wider social issues were at stake and that it was essential to tackle them so to be able to ensure support for the alliance and for its strategic concept. In addition, according to the British, this new approach would have had the advantage of involving new experts, who could devote themselves to the CCMS. 58 Hence, in their preliminary response to the American proposals, FCO officials suggested 'that the role of the Science Committee
should be left open until it has become clear how much emphasis NATO wants to give to technological as opposed to social fields'. 59 In the corridors of Whitehall there was also frustration about not having been consulted prior to the announcement, or at the very least warned. In the eyes of the British, there appeared to be a lack of appreciation on the part of the Americans for the relatively smaller means of its partners:
it seems that the most difficult problem will be to find ways of getting the Americans to recognise the need for a selective approach to the development of intergovernmental organisation activities. Their habit of making a massive assault on the problems of the moment is sustainable by the massive resources of money and manpower they can command, but the technique is not one that transplants very readily to the countries of Western Europe. 60 
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During the preliminary stages of the negotiations, the British Delegation at NATO was instructed to keep a low profile and let other delegations express concern. The United Kingdom should not appear to take the lead neither in promoting nor in slowing down the project. 61 In summer Their wider membership also allowed other international organisations to avoid giving the impression that the environment label actually hid some military, or in any case Cold War-related, intentions. In addition, FCO officials suggested that NATO focus on social rather than technological problems as the former
were not yet the focus of international cooperation. Most of all, the British were very critical of the creation of a separate new committee and advised that the new initiative should start by keeping a low profile, at least at the beginning, to avoid raising unrealistic expectations among the public, which could eventually backfire. 62 To the FCO's surprise, Brosio seemed to agree with most of their suggestions and spoke in favour of the new committee as 'a ginger group' that would act as a catalyst and stimulate the work of other organisations already engaged in talks. 63 Brosio seemed receptive to the idea that NATO should involve itself in social rather than in technical fields and agreed that the alliance had neither the expertise nor the room to carry out new research. The impression left with the FCO officials was that Brosio was keen to follow up on Nixon's proposal but there was still time to discuss things in details. 64 Brosio then travelled to the United States, where he was presented with a full list of subjects for the CCMS, mostly technological in nature. To the consternation of the British officials following his meetings in Washington, Brosio observed that 'while we had felt initially that the social field was the most promising, some Governments had suggested that social problems were more complicated and that involvement with them might expose NATO to criticism'. 65 The Americans found unexpected support in the French, who expressed concerns about NATO's involvement in social issues, which -according to them -could lead to unpleasant interference in the internal affairs of its members and restrict national sovereignty. 66 Soon after the return of Brosio to Brussels the diplomatic exchanges regarding the CCMS moved quickly and the FCO was surprised both by the level of American involvement and by the consequent speed with which the alliance moved forward. 67 It seemed already too late to influence anything, and the British -along with their European counterparts -were left with no choice but to show to be willing participants. The FCO found Randers' report 'unsatisfactory in a number of ways, notably in its sketchy and incomplete treatment of the terms of reference'. 68 The Preparatory Committee met in September 1969 and the British Delegation was instructed to reinforce the point that the United Kingdom saw the new body as a 'ginger group' and that as such it should not engage in research. 69 Given its scepticism and frustration, the FCO was reluctant to send 15 high-profile names to the meeting and resisted the American request for the presence of Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser in the Cabinet Office. 70 The Preparatory Committee's papers show evidence of the predictable European resistance to the creation of a new powerful and free-standing committee as well as the concern that the CCMS would lead the alliance into new uncharted territory where there was no consensus within the Council. The
Europeans demanded clear and binding terms of reference, a limited mandate, light structure, no budget and no full-time staff. This was all agreed and it was decided that the Committee would meet in two annual plenary sessions at cabinet or subcabinet levels to provide guidance and approve new pilot projects. It was also made clear that the CCMS would be powerless to force implementation and that the members, including those who had run the pilot study, were free to act according to their national interests and priorities. 71 Given that several experts had already declared themselves too busy to dedicate time to the CCMS, the Foreign Office initially planned to use the staff already available within their NATO permanent delegation for all CCMS-related work. Yet, the Americans expressed their desire for highcalibre names to show that the project had the full support of the British government and to dispel the impression that this was a purely American-driven operation. The American Ambassador in London personally visited the Foreign Office to discuss the matter and similar pressure was put on the British Ambassador in Washington. 72 Yet, the FCO resisted and, to the disappointments of the Americans, eventually agreed to send Dr Cottrell, Deputy Chief Adviser. This was more than the FCO had planned to but less than the Americans had asked for, which led to frustration on both sides.
Given the British outstanding commitment to the Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment and the increasing discussions within NATO about the challenges of modern society, the FCO created a new desk within its Science and Technology Department to deal with the problems connected to the human environment, which indirectly allowed the Foreign Office to show at least a certain degree of engagement with the CCMS. 73 It is worth mentioning that this was also the time in which Britain was experiencing environmental disasters first hand. In the spring of 1967 the Torrey Canyon oil spill on the southwest coast of the United Kingdom affected hundreds of miles of coastline in the United Kingdom, France, Guernsey and Spain. In the summer of 1969, precisely when the FCO was pondering the British position regarding the CCMS, an estimated 50-100,000 seabirds were found dead in the Irish Sea due to sea pollution. 74 These events of course made the environmental issue very pressing but this did not mean that the CCMS was seen as the best answer.
The first plenary meeting of the CCMS took place in December 1969, only eight months after Nixon's speech. 75 The event was at the centre of a highly orchestrated media campaign with journalists from all NATO countries being accredited and admitted to the plenary session for the first time in December 1969 . 76 In the following months, observers from non-NATO members were also admitted to plenary sessions and to the meetings of the Committee's pilot study groups, although the Council reserved the right to consider-case-by-case each time. 77 Denis Richards of the British Delegation recalled the inaugural CCMS meeting as a being pervaded by 'self-congratulatory euphoria'. In his words, it was in fact: 16 a rather messy meeting because, under pressure from the Americans, a topsy-turvy format was followed whereby we had first the presentation of the individual pilot projects and then, only this morning, we discussed the Committee's procedure. The United Kingdom made much of an impression at the meeting. We are almost alone amongst the major countries in not sending special experts to the meeting. . . . We were also nearly unique in not tabling any papers at the meeting . . . I think that our failure so far to follow through at the substantive level may lead to some scepticism about our professed interest in this NATO initiative. This is not a good way to win friends and influence people. 79 The United Kingdom was also almost alone in not offering to co-pilot a project, and Alan Cottrell stressed that it was important 'to consider at least whether we ought to declare fairly quickly that we would be willing to co-pilot the German study on knowledge and decision-making. If we do not join in a bit more, we shall find ourselves rather isolated'. 80 In a private conversation with Solly Zuckerman, Cottrell warned that:
because of this very strong American interest in fostering all international aspects of environmental questions, and because they feel the need for a dependable partner, in their initiatives in this field, we have much to gain politically by responding more positively to their invitations, quite apart from technical and in some cases commercial benefits that may derive from our participation in these new international developments. 81 The reason Dr Cottrell's proposal was so vague was because the FCO persisted in their effort to shift the focus to social science with a proposal for a pilot study on individual and group motivation.
Unfortunately, however, they were eventually unable to pull it off because their key partner, the Social Science Research Council, refused to participate. The SSRC was afraid it might damage its own reputation and international collaborations by association with a political organisation. In addition, the 17 SSRC resented that no funds were to be made available for the research to be carried out for the pilot study and that the Council was asked to pay 'for an enterprise which is essentially a diplomatic one'. 82 Thus, the FCO was forced to come up with an alternative plan quickly and eventually suggested a slightly amended proposal on motivation and work satisfaction. The delay and the half-baked proposal meant that once again Britain gave the impression of being recalcitrant, to great annoyance of the Americans. British officials in the NATO Delegation doubted that 'the public image of the alliance will be significantly improved as a result in the near future.' 83 Eventually, continuous pressure from Washington, combined with the advice coming from
Cottrell and the British Delegation at NATO, persuaded the Foreign Office to step up its game and to send Sir Solly Zuckerman to the CCMS plenary meeting in October 1970. 84 Yet, it was made clear that Sir Solly would be able to attend only the first day and that there was no guarantee that he or anybody of a similar rank would be sent in the future. In addition, the British representatives to the CCMS would be given a well-informed proposal for a pilot study on individual and group motivation, 'otherwise we should either look silly or else lay ourselves open to the charge that we were not serious in our declared intention of playing a constructive part in the Committee'. 85 It should be pointed out that although the proposal for a pilot study on individual and group motivation eventually went ahead and gained CCMS approval, the Americans were less than enthusiastic about it and regarded it as essentially a lot of hot air. Mr Moynihan thought it 'to be too narrowly conceived . . . and not of sufficiently wide application in the international field'. 86 When Mr
Moynihan visited in London in April 1970 on his way to Brussels, he made no secret of the fact that he felt that the British remained disappointingly lukewarm about the CCMS. 87 Yet, for diplomatic reasons, and to show to the other members that the British were on board, at the CCMS meeting Mr Moynihan supported the pilot study on individual and group motivation. Yet, despite the fact that the British proposal received the go-ahead, Cottrell had the distinct feeling that there was the lingering impression that 'the United Kingdom was not taking an adequate part in the work that has been put in hand' and that Britain was still thought of being recalcitrant. 88 The launch of the pilot studies had happened so quickly that it became impossible -and indeed detrimental to national interests -not to participate. In the words of Ronald Arculus, of the FCO Science and Technology Department:
we are all agreed that NATO is not the best place to handle the substance of international environmental work. But the fact is that the Americans have now succeeded in starting a good deal of international discussion in the CCMS, some of which may lead to developments which may affect the UK, whether we like it or not. The Americans clearly suspect us of dragging our feet; and the other European countries . . . have since showed themselves more willing than ourselves to contribute effectively to CCMS's work. In other words, we now face a situation where we will probably need to participate in CCMS activities to protect our own interests (for example over motor vehicle safety) and to help steer them in a sensible direction. 89 
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The pilot study on road safety led by the Americans was a good example indeed. According to the Director of the Road Research Laboratory, the United Kingdom could not participate in the pilot study because its experts were already heavily committed elsewhere. Yet, the study had direct implications on the car-manufacturing sector, and the British were keen to protect their carmakers. So, albeit reluctantly, they had to take part. The United Kingdom appointed Dr Lyons (Director, Road Research Laboratory, Bracknell) to lead the British experts. The Americans organised a conference on road safety in Detroit and invited representatives from the automobile industries from several NATO countries and beyond. Japan, for example, sent representatives from government and industry; Sweden was also invited and Saab and Volvo participated. Among the British car manufacturers, Rolls Royce, Kangol (seat belts) and Smiths Instruments were represented. 90 Other pilot studies raised more difficult questions and directly contradicted the principle of noninterference and non-duplication established at the launch of the CCMS. It was proposed, for example, to run a pilot study on oil spills. The Foreign Office and several other departments in Whitehall were sceptical of -if not outright opposed to -the idea. There was an obvious risk of duplicating what was already being done effectively by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which also had the non-negligible advantage of including important key nations like the Soviet Union and Japan. In the eyes of the FCO, a study on oil spills could be easily misconstrued by non-NATO members as a façade behind which hid military and strategic planning. 91 In the first couple of years, the CCMS moved at a hectic pace and launched numerous pilot studies on a variety of topics. This led to the frustration of many European members, particularly the smaller ones who often did not have the sufficient number of experts and the right know-how. Even the British, who could rely on a much wider pool of experts than, let's say, Belgium, found it difficult to cope. Mr Lyons, Director of the Road Research Laboratory, put forward a rather critical view:
the American steamroller tactics in the CCMS were particularly difficult for us. It was evident that the United States was unilaterally trying to impose its own solutions upon its NATO partners. The road safety project had now snowballed. There were some 8 or 9 studies on the agenda and the US wanted the other CCMS members to play their full part in all of them. What was particularly galling was that, in most of these sectors, the United
States was well behind Europe. 92 In December 1970 the British Delegation to NATO sent a report about the first year of life of the CCMS, which makes interesting reading for both the frank tone and the colourful details. The CCMS was at the stage of making the first recommendations to the Council. The first eight pilot projects had developed at dramatically different speeds and many had been hampered by continued discussion about the risk of avoiding duplication and by the excessive demand on experts' time. According to the report 'the battle against duplication was not won when the terms of reference were agreed. It has to be fought over and over again'. Many Europeans resented the American high-pressure tactics: 'the authorities in Washington may take months to decide that they want the CCMS to do something; but once they have decided, they want action within days'. Sometimes meetings were called only three days ahead of time 19 and, needless to say, the Americans demanded -almost without exception -high-level representation, regardless of the level of expertise.
It is no longer possible to joke about this, for fear of being taken seriously. Ask someone in the cafeteria whether he has heard that the Americans have just announced a Cabinet-level
Colloquium on the Noise of Motor Bicycles to be held in Newfoundland starting tomorrow night; and he is more likely to start to his feet in apprehension than to smile back in disbelief. 93 It also looked as if in its first year the CCMS had taken up an undue amount of the Council's time, for the most part on procedural questions. On the positive side, according to the British Delegation, there
had not been any case of obvious duplication and 'the CCMS has certainly had a gingering-up effect on some NATO countries', particularly on those who did not have a governmental interest in the environment. In addition, smaller countries with fewer or no experts in some of these fields profited considerably from the exchange of expertise. Overall, the CCMS seemed to be building a reputation 'for injecting more urgency to international work on the environment'.
Yet, the authors pointed out that 'this Delegation has found itself acting at various times as a post office, a shock absorber and an oil can; we are regularly interposed between American dynamism and the understandable reluctance of Whitehall to provide experts at short notice for CCMS-sponsored meetings'. Finally, the UK Delegation was pleased to announce that Mr Moynihan was about to return to academic life. This was a great relief for the British officials in Brussels and London, who had found him personally difficult to deal with. The delegation suggested that 'it is possible that American interest in the CCMS may tail off after his departure'. The report concluded that the CCMS may 'go on producing some useful results, perhaps at the cost of disproportionate effort' but 'we doubt that the public image of the alliance will be significantly improved as a result in the near future'. 94 The British were not alone in thinking in these terms and the most incensed were the CCMS's supporters, who were disappointed and frustrated. In an internal memo to Brosio, Randers complained that the flow of information on the status of pilot studies was slow, that progress of several studies was 'sluggish', that 'recommendations tended to be imprecise and generalised' and that there was still too much emphasis on research rather than on recommendations. Finally, despite all the efforts to avoid it, Randers also had to recognise that there were 'overlaps with efforts of other organisations.'
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The CCMS in Action
Although the primary purpose of this article is to examine the diplomatic tensions behind the launch of the CCMS, it may be helpful to examine here briefly the subsequent development of the Committee as it offers further evidence of how the CCMS's work expanded the alliance's vision and interest in out-ofarea events.
At its first plenary session in December 1969 and productive international activity of its kind'. Yet Moynihan was aware that 'it will take a long time for the program to become self-sustaining' and warned that 'any relaxation of American effort during that interval is likely to be fatal'. 98 The West Germans enthusiastically supported the Americans. The CCMS received strong personal backing from Chancellor Willy Brandt, who sent high-calibre names to all meetings. 99 In the In 1971 NATO launched the CCMS Fellowship Programme and the CCMS continued to launch new pilot studies, which focused primarily on technology and scientific knowledge transfer. 102 However, as Macekura has pointed out, in his second term Richard Nixon shifted his attention away from environmental issues and focused more on diplomatic dialogue with the East and the need to secure domestic support for it. The newly elected US President, Jimmy Carter, was equally supportive of CCMS and publicly praised its work. 103 1977 was also the year of the Ekofisk oilrig blow-out, when an estimated 126,000 barrels of oil were spilled in the North Sea. Studies published in the same period showed how increasing air pollution was accelerating the degrading of Europe's most important monuments and cultural heritage sites, with Venice a case in point. The Ekofisk disaster and Venice's degrading monuments provided NATIS with further evidence of the necessity of the work of the CCMS and were amply used in its information material. 104 In its early years, the CCMS played an important part in the development of treaty law. Yet, other -possibly more appropriate -forums were launched to address the legal aspects of wide-ranging environmental problems. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in particular, gave birth to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which became responsible for coordinating most of the international community's efforts to address global environmental issues. 106 After that, although the CCMS continued to serve as a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas, it was side-lined by the new body which encompassed a larger number of countries.
In second half of the 1970s there were suggestions -primarily from the United States and Italy, and occasionally the United Kingdom -that the CCMS should address the social and institutional challenges facing modern society entering the post-industrial era, which would have allowed the CCMS to find its own niche. Yet, hardly anything came of it. The sudden increase in East-West tensions following the invasion of Afghanistan brought the alliance's attention back to military defence. The CCMS and the environmental problem were quickly shifted to the back burner. On the occasion of the CCMS's tenth anniversary, experts pointed out that 'the CCMS had some early, highly visible successes and has produced some solid work over the years, but it has begun to suffer from lack of high level political attention and support'. 107 The CCMS continued its work until the end of the Cold War and beyond on a variety of projects as varied as forest fires, preservation of historical stained glass, aircraft noise and indoor air quality, as well as more obvious ones like environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and activities. 
Conclusion
If we look at the history of the CCMS as the history of NATO's attempt to engage with the public and to widen its own security scope, it is clear that the new initiative -at least to a certain extent -did help develop a new scientific dimension to the alliance and contributed to the international debate on the environment. The CCMS's work proved particularly useful in the early phases of new problem areas, 22 when issues were still vague and ill-defined. In 1971, for example, the conference of mayors held in Indianapolis was useful to clarify the key terms of research on the problems connected with urbanisation and to define common ground of interest. The pilot study on air-pollution produced agreement on the scientific basis and systems methodology for national air quality management programmes. The road safety pilot study contributed to the debate that eventually led to the introduction of national regulations on seat belts, inspections, auxiliary vehicle lights and alcohol tests. 110 The most obvious positive result was the intensification of the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge among experts, which helped strengthen the international network of skilled professionals and to develop new methods of collaboration. The CCMS workshops and conferences helped experts establish contacts and exchange ideas with minimal bureaucratic interference from either the alliance or national governments. According to some of the experts who took part in the CCMS initiatives, the great advantage was the discussion of problems and failures, which were often neglected in official academic conferences but were 'extremely important to avoid waste of resources and
Equally important is to point out that to a certain extent the CCMS did have the 'gingering up' effect that the British had hoped. At the time of its launch, many NATO countries had neither the infrastructure nor the expertise to contribute significantly to the work of the Committee. In order to respond to American pressure, national governments sat up new agencies and diverted funds towards research and training in this field. Smaller countries with fewer or no experts in some of these fields profited considerably from exchange of expertise.
On the other hand, however, many of the CCMS recommendations remained on paper due to the lack of enthusiasm of several national governments and the costs involved. Local action was often delayed or reticent as national governments and regional authorities resented interference and often claimed that the peculiarities of their own specific situation made the CCMS's recommendations irrelevant. The CCMS's programme was indeed flexible and free from excessive bureaucratic control.
The disadvantage was that it was also eclectic and fragmented, with no overarching purpose and no clearly defined raison d'être. As a result several pilot-studies 'ended in a whimper, blessed by platitudes and quietly filed away'. 112 Perhaps the most important pilot study in terms of building the preliminary basis for the concept of out-of-area and crisis management operations is the pilot study on Disaster
Assistance carried out by the United States and Italy, which looked at the possibility of cooperation in the case of natural and man-made disasters and which contemplated the possibility of intervening in support of countries in need outside the NATO area itself.
It is questionable, however, whether all these efforts translated into increased support for the alliance and how much the CCMS helped persuade the younger generations that NATO meant more than military defence. A cursory survey of the newspapers at the time suggests that it was the United Nations and the Stockholm Conference that led the environmental effort in the public's mind. National The history of NATO has often been interpreted either as an extension of American foreign policy, whereby the allies more or less simply bowed to the American will in their attempt to keep the United States tied to Europe's defence, or as an organisation with a will of its own, whereby 'NATO decided' to do something or the other. Yet, neither narrative is exact. In the words of a diplomat in the know, NATO was -and is -an 'organised controversy'. www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17551.htm (last retrieved on 1 Oct. 2015). In addition to NATO's own official publication, the most useful academic contributions to study of the history of
